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Abstract
In this paper, I critically review the usefulness of functional neuroimaging to the cognitive
psychologist.  All serious cognitive theories acknowledge that cognition is implemented
somewhere in the brain.  Finding that the brain "activates" differentially while performing
different tasks is therefore gratifying but not surprising. The key problem is that the additional
dependent variable that imaging data represents, is often one about which cognitive theories
make no necessary predictions.  It is, therefore, inappropriate to use such data to choose
between such theories.  Even supposing that fMRI were able to tell us where a particular
cognitive process was performed, that would likely tell us little of relevance about how it was
performed.  The how-question is the crucial question for theorists investigating the functional
architecture of the human mind.  The argument is illustrated with particular reference to Henson
(2005) and Shallice (2003), who make the opposing case.
keywords:  functional neuroimaging, cognitive psychology
Introduction
In the past 15 years or so, the development of functional neuroimaging techniques, from
Single Photon Emission Tomography (SPET) to Positron Emission Tomography (PET) and,
most recently, to functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI), has led to an explosion in
their application in the field of experimental psychology in general and cognitive psychology in
particular.  In this article, I make the case that the huge investment of time and money that has
accompanied this trend has not resulted in a corresponding theoretical advancement, at least
with respect to cognitive psychological theory.  As a consequence, I ask whether the time has
come for reflection and reappraisal on behalf of both practitioners and funders.
The relevant functional neuroimaging literature is already of such a bewildering size that it
would be difficult for a single person adequately to survey the literature in a single article.  I am
fortunate, therefore, that Henson (2005) and Shallice (2003) have recently set out their claims
for the usefulness of functional neuroimaging in more general terms.  Their contributions are
extremely welcome in that they allow a theoretical debate to be conducted somewhat
independently of debates concerning individual findings.  Of course, both have illustrated their
arguments with reference to particular studies and I will attempt to do the same, not least in
order to question the conclusions that they draw.  Nonetheless, I shall try, as they have, to
abstract general arguments away from individual claims.  In this sense, this article should not be
thought of as a direct response to either of these two articles, even though the more general case
it makes is structured around the issues that they raise.
Several points should be made very clearly from the start.
First, this article is not about “good” versus “bad” science. Much of the neuroimaging work
to which I will refer is above reproach in terms of its scientific credibility.  I shall nonetheless
maintain that it does not constitute good cognitive psychology.
Second, this article is not about future and/or different technologies.  I will concentrate
almost exclusively on fMRI technology, since this seems to be the current state of the art in
functional neuroimaging.  I will not question the usefulness of fMRI as a technique in general,
restricting myself to a consideration of its usefulness to cognitive psychology.  My arguments
may well apply to other techniques such as electroencephalography (EEG) or
magnetoencephalography (MEG) but for the sake of clarity I will not consider these here.  Nor
are these arguments directed towards the next generation of technologies that are (quite
reasonably) claimed to be just around the corner.  It is doubtless better to wait for such
developments to occur before trying to assess them.
Third, this article is not intended to be vexatious, that is, it is not written to annoy functional
neuroimagers.  It is intended to be a serious contribution to a worthwhile debate.  Having said
that, it is my intention to express the argument reasonably robustly.  In this spirit, I will
deliberately make reference, towards the end of the article, to relevant strategic/political
matters.  This runs the risk of upsetting certain readers but I do not see how the discussion of
such an expensive and resource-intensive technology can be separated from its consequences,
particularly as those relate to research funding.
Fourth, my intention here is to raise questions about functional neuroimaging as applied to
cognitive psychology.  Those questions might well have perfectly good answers, though not
ones that have yet been given a good airing in print.  If this paper draws out such answers in
any reaction it provokes, then so much the better.  I shall try to give the argument its best shot
in the hope of stimulating just such a response.
Finally, it is important to acknowledge from the outset that I am far from being the first to
question the contribution of functional neuroimaging to experimental cognitive psychology.
Coltheart (2002; this issue) has been particularly erudite in his raising of concerns, and he has
drawn on work by Fodor (1999), Harley (2004a, 2004b), Paap (1997), Uttal (2001), Van Orden
and Paap (1997), among others. Nonetheless, in Coltheart (this issue) he has concentrated on
whether functional imaging has yet told us something about the functioning of the human mind;
he concluded in the negative, though the majority of his respondents disagreed.  In this article I
shall take Coltheart’s side, but will try to go deeper in investigating why the contribution of
functional imaging to the study of mind has apparently been so slim and, indeed, whether it
might always tend to be so.
Having dealt with preliminaries, it is now necessary to state the basic premise of my
argument.  It is not particularly radical.  It is that a cognitive psychologist’s job is to seek to
explain, on a functional level, the workings of the (human) mind, that is, to explicate the mind’s
functional architecture (Pylyshyn, 1980; Coltheart, 2002). In a slogan, the cognitive
psychologist wishes to know how the mind works, not where the brain works.  Of course,
nobody would deny that there is a link between the two, but my point is that it is not a
necessary one, at least not at the scale addressed by fMRI. I further contend (contrary to some
who might otherwise be in my corner) that learning how the brain implements the mind is both
interesting and relevant to cognitive psychology.  Nevertheless, I maintain that this latter
question will not be satisfactorily addressed by fMRI, except perhaps as a weak enabling
technology (see the later discussion of localization). By the time that cognitive models are
sufficiently well specified to be able to make genuinely necessary and differential predictions
regarding, say, the Blood-Oxygen-Level Dependent (BOLD) signal, then they will very likely
already have enough behavioral clout to be distinguished without reference to neuroimages.
In what follows, I will expand upon this premise with particular reference to Henson’s
(2005) and Shallice’s (2003) arguments and examples, as well as with more general reference
to disputes such as those involving single- and dual-route theories, in which functional
neuroimaging might, prima facie, be thought to be decisive.  I shall start by trying to get to
grips with some fundamental issues.
Fundamental issues
fMRI as a dependent variable and the function-to-structure mapping
Proponents of functional neuroimaging in cognitive psychology often start by maintaining,
as does Henson (2005), that the BOLD signal in an fMRI experiment is simply another
dependent variable, like reaction time (RT) or accuracy, and that the availability of such a extra
dependent variable cannot in itself be a bad thing.  Of course in one sense they are correct,
although the rather obvious counterargument is that there is a very large number of variables
that one might potentially measure in an experiment (e.g., a participant’s body temperature) and
that normally, therefore, we would restrict ourselves to measuring dependent variables about
which the theories under test have something necessary to say.  (This restriction would apply
with increased force to the extent to which a particular dependent variable was either difficult
or expensive to collect.) Henson is well aware of this rejoinder, and therefore goes to some
lengths to justify the assumption that imaging data are indeed such a relevant dependent
variable.  To this end he develops the notion of a “function-to-structure mapping”, maintaining
that “functional neuroimaging data are only relevant if there is some systematic mapping
between “which” psychological process is currently engaged and “where” activity is changing
in the brain” (Henson, 2005, p.196). Even this seemingly innocuous statement raises some
pertinent questions, but most of these are more profitably posed in relation to two more specific
components of Henson’s proposed mapping, namely his “function-to-structure deduction” and
his “structure-to-function induction”. I shall therefore consider each of these in turn.
Function-to-structure deduction.
Henson’s (2005) function-to-structure deduction was expressed thus:
“if conditions C1 and C2 produce qualitatively different patterns of activity over the brain,
then conditions C1 and C2 differ in at least one function, F. The definition of “qualitatively” is
considered in greater detail later but entails a reliable statistical interaction between conditions
C1 and C2 and at least two brain regions R1 and R2” (Henson, 2005, p.197).
Of course, C1 and C2 may well differ in at least one function in the absence of any
(detectable) differences in activity, and Henson duly noted the fact.  That means, of course, that
no imaging data are capable, in principle, of contradicting a theory that predicts the engagement
of two different functions in conditions C1 and C2.
In a previous discussion of this point (Page, 2004), I used the example of a tonotopic map.
In such a map (for which there happens to be respectable evidence), different parts are auditory
cortex are activated in response to tones of different frequencies, such that the relationship is
relatively systematic.  If we take the presentation of a low tone to constitute condition C1 and
the presentation of high tone to constitute condition C2, then following Henson’s logic we are
encouraged to use the different spatial distributions of activation in support of any (arbitrary)
theory that proposes that the detection of different frequencies is accomplished by processes
that “differ in at least one function”. (Note that this argument would hold even for tones
differing by a just noticeable difference, provided that our functional imaging was of high
enough resolution.) Given that frequency detection is being performed in each task, it is not
obvious, however, what this different function might be.  Henson addressed this issue,
suggesting that although the deduction would indeed be misleading if one were to treat
frequency detection as the function in question (because it suggests two functions where only
one is present), the deduction would be sound if one were to treat high-frequency detection as a
different function from low-frequency detection.  This does indeed save the deduction, but at an
unreasonable cost:  after all, if conditions C1 (low tone) and C2 (high tone) are functionally
distinct by definition then the patterns of brain activation are irrelevant, whether they suggest
functional distinction or not.
The key point here is that one can imagine trying to choose between two theories, one that
predicts the engagement of different functions (i.e., qualitatively different mechanisms) for
tones of different frequencies and one that does not.  What seems awkward from Henson’s
(2005) point of view is that the functional imaging can, if anything, lead one to make the
unwarranted inference of two distinct functions.  He suggests that one can avoid this error, at
least for the specific case of the tonotopic map, by specifying in detail the precise neural
mechanisms under consideration.  Scanning might be decisive, he claims, in choosing between
a pitch-detection mechanism that involves neurons tuned to respond to particular frequencies
such that those neurons are arranged systematically into a spatial map, and an alternative that
has pitch montonically related to the activation of a single set of neurons (i.e., not
systematically arranged). He may be right (it depends on the bridging assumptions) but his
example implies that for scanning to be effective in choosing between two theories in general,
the full neural implementation of each will need to be spelled out in advance, in terms of
activation and spatial distribution.  For most cognitive-level theories, this will not be remotely
practicable.
Generalizing away from the tonotopic map, and assuming a broadly materialist position, it is
a logical necessity that any two stimuli that give rise to different percepts or behaviors, that is,
any two stimuli that are in any way discriminable, must give rise to different patterns of brain
activity.  After all, the brain is not in the business of performing impossible discriminations.  It
is overwhelmingly likely, therefore, that very many stimulus pairs will give rise to activation
patterns that are qualitatively different in the strict (statistical) sense required by Henson’s
(2005) definitions.  To be sure, there is a question regarding whether one’s current scanner will
be sensitive enough to detect the difference. Assuming that it is so sensitive, the function-to-
structure deduction seems to propose a proliferation of distinct functions, one for each
discriminable stimulus-pair.  By extension, as technology improves, and as scanners become
more sensitive to activation differences at smaller scales then the number of hypothesized
functions will proliferate further.  This is surely absurd:  that is just not the way a cognitive
psychologist attributes functions. Functions are hypothesized on the basis of a (potentially
incorrect) theoretical analysis of the task at hand.  To reiterate, it would seem that for such a
functional decomposition of a task to license predictions about activity patterns at the scale
appropriate to, say, fMRI, each corresponding cognitive-psychological model would have to be
specified not only in terms of the neural hardware with which it is hypothesized to be
implemented, but also in terms of the necessary spatial distribution of that hardware in the
brain.  Note that this is not the same as having a computational or connectionist (neural
network) model of the relevant function:  such models are rarely either specified in terms of
actual neural hardware or specified spatially (as opposed to topologically). If our cognitive-
psychological models don’t make necessary predictions about the spatial distribution of their
functional parts, then how can we use spatial distribution of neural activation to choose between
them?
Perhaps I’m being too literal in my interpretation of Henson’s (2005) function-to-structure
deduction.  One might say that my tonotopic map example is likely to involve far too “local” a
region-by-task interaction to license functional conclusions.  That is to say, a region-by-task
activation will be the more impressive if it involves regions that are more widely separated in
space.  In fact, Henson makes no such stipulation, but his examples do tend to show something
of the sort.  So should a nonlocal region-by-task interaction in BOLD signal be considered good
evidence for the engagement of different functions?  There are several reasons to be cautious.
First, there is the problem of epiphenomenal activity, that is, brain activity that is a consequence
of task-related processing but that can be considered a nonfunctional byproduct with respect to
the processes under consideration. A couple of examples should suffice.
Seron and Fias (this issue) discussed the role of the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) and noted its
apparent involvement in the representation of abstract number semantics.  Given this
involvement they proposed that activation of IPS might be used to settle a dispute about the
transcoding of numbers.  Briefly, this dispute concerns whether the activation of abstract
number semantics is a necessary component of, say, the transcoding of Arabic numerals to
spoken output.  Among the problems that Seron and Fias themselves identify with using IPS
activation as a gauge of abstract-semantic involvement, is that such representations might well
activate during the transcoding task even though such activation is not necessary to perform the
task. Since the debate is precisely about necessity, any semantic activation that is observed in a
neuroimaging study can be considered epiphenomenal according to one theory.  That theory
will survive any number of demonstrations that the relevant area is “active” in the transcoding
task.
As a second example among many, Pulvermüller (1999) has suggested that, for example, the
cortical representations of action words and perception words will differ in spatial distribution.
Thus action words like “run” will be associated (via Hebbian learning) with neurons in motor,
premotor and prefrontal cortices, whereas perception words like “rough” will be associated with
cortical areas representing somatosensory qualities.  Pulvermüller maintains, among other
things, that the auditory presentation of each word will activate these associated areas, leading
to distinct patterns of distributed activation for each.  And yet nobody interested in, say, the
lexical access function would use this region-by-word interaction as evidence that the processes
of lexical access were themselves different in the two cases.  This is particularly the case given
the fact that the two words “run” and “rough” will likely compete during lexical access owing
to their phonological overlap.
Apart from the problem of epiphenomenal activity, there is an additional problem for the
epistemological status of a region-by-task interaction.  That concerns whether the engagement
of two different regions, even regions well separated in the brain, necessarily implies two
different functions or, more particularly, two functions that differ in type.  It is worth
considering two cases.
In the first case, the regional interaction in activity would be accompanied by some
qualitative difference in behavior.  In this case, any inference that can be made on the basis of
the brain activity seems rather superfluous:  if there is a demonstrable qualitative change in
behavior then there could hardly be no difference in brain activity (whether or not such is
detectable). Whether such a difference represents a change in the type of processing will not
itself be indicated by the corresponding neuroimages.
In the second case, any regional interaction in activity across conditions would not be
accompanied by a qualitative change in behavior.  Considering this case, though, one could
hardly hope for better evidence that the same function could be performed in two different
regions (assuming one had ruled out epiphenomenal activity as a possible explanation). One
might, of course, resist this explanation and conclude that one’s behavioral measures were not
sensitive enough to detect the presence of two qualitatively different types of process.  Yet such
a finding would be purely adventitious:  It’s difficult to see why one would design an imaging
study to investigate whether two types of process were operative in a task for which the
behavioral evidence suggested no such decomposition.  Perhaps such studies are common, in
which a function that has previously been considered unitary is shown to engage qualitatively
different brain areas under circumstances in which both epiphenomenal activity and a one-to-
many function-to-structure mapping can be ruled out.  Perhaps such studies routinely lead to the
adoption of new behavioral measures sensitive enough to capture the processing difference.  If
so, then I have no doubt that respondents to this article will give details.  Having said that, if the
usefulness of cognitive neuroimaging is limited to such cases, one would want to be persuaded
that the results were worth the investment.
Both these considerations, of epiphenomenal activity and of one-to-many function-to-
structure mapping, might seem rather like special pleading, were it not the case that they both
crop up in relation to one or other of the examples that I discuss below.  Before I consider those
examples, I turn to Henson’s (2005) structure-to-function induction.
The structure-to-function induction.
Henson’s (2005) structure-to-function induction was stated thus
“if condition C2 elicits responses in brain region R1 relative to some baseline condition C0
and region R1 has been associated with function F1 in a different context (e.g.  in a comparison
of condition C1 versus C0 in a previous experiment), then function F1 is also implicated in
condition C2”, (Henson, 2005, p.  198).
Again, this raises several questions.  First, how was function F1 associated with the region
R1 in the first place. Any straight comparison between activation patterns in conditions C1 and
C0 will result in some regions for which the activation pattern differs reliably (provided
resolution is good enough) and other areas where the activation patterns are not reliably
different, though they will very likely differ “numerically”. As Henson acknowledges, any of
these regions might be the locus of the hypothesized functional difference between the two
conditions.  Second, the structure-to-function induction seems straightforwardly to discount the
possibility that the same brain region (loosely defined) might perform different functions
depending on the task at hand.  Note that this does not require any commitment to its being the
same neurons involved in both cases:  a single region might contain two spatially interdigitated
functional systems with no neural overlap.  It may also be that the exact same neurons
activating in different configurations, or bound in different ways, might implement two or more
different functions.  Henson himself refers to the studies of Duncan (2001) in which networks
of frontal-lobe neurons, respond quickly to changing task demands, presumably by some sort of
functional reconfiguration.  Whether such functional reconfiguration involves the same neurons
or, instead, a switch between interdigitated subnetworks, there doesn’t seem to be much a priori
support for a one-function-per-region assumption, particularly at the resolution of fMRI.
The third question regarding the structure-to-function induction is one that raises a
fundamental question about the BOLD signal.  Henson (2005) induces the “implication” of
function F1 from a “response” in region R1. But what if the experimental condition C2 requires
the suppression of function F1?  Would this also show up as a response in the region R1 with
which that function is associated?  Or suppose that in condition C2, neural hardware in region
R1 attempts to implement processes that are associated with function F1 but does not, for
whatever reason, generate a response that subsequently affects some to-be-explained behavior
(a version of the epiphenomenal activity problem). Is it possible that this will also result in
activation in region R1, from which the successful operation of function F1 might be incorrectly
inferred?
In order to address this question, it is necessary to look carefully at what exactly the BOLD
signal indicates.  The classic (although relatively recent) enabling texts in this regard are the
article and companion book chapter by Logothetis and colleagues (Logothetis et al., 2001;
Logothetis, 2003). In their pioneering work, they measured the BOLD response while
simultaneously performing intracortical recordings of neural signals, in particular taking
measurements of local field potentials (LFPs) and single- and multi-unit activity. Given its
frequent citation, you might think that this work would be fully supportive of the scanning
enterprise.  In fact, there are important caveats.  The first of these is expressed very clearly by
Logothetis et al.  (2001):
“These findings suggest that the BOLD contrast mechanism reflects the input and
intracortical processing of a given area rather than its spiking output.” (Logothetis et al.  2001;
p.150)
and
“The present findings also imply that the greater portion of the haemodynamic signal
changes reflect the energetically expensive synaptic activity such as that related to the LFP
signals.  Both our physiological measurements and the spectroscopy results are incompatible
with models suggesting a quantitative relationship between the spike rate of neurons and the
haemodynamic response” (Logothetis et al., 2001, p.154).
The point is reinforced by Logothetis (2003) who summarizes
“the BOLD signal primarily measures the input and processing of neural information within
a region and not the output signal transmitted to other brain regions.” (Logothetis, 2003; p.62)
These quotations quite clearly illustrate that when one sees differential activation in a given
region of the brain, one cannot conclude that that region, and any of the (possibly multiple)
functions it implements, are “implicated” in any behavior-generating process.  Neuroimagers
assume that when a brain part "activates" it is likely to be functionally engaged in a task.  This
work of Logothetis and colleagues shows that a brain region can activate according to the fMRI
measure without producing any outputs.  In the absence of outputs it is highly unlikely to be
driving behavior, that is, it is unlikely to be functionally engaged.  Moreover, input to an area,
and processing within it, are almost certainly necessary for the (active) disengagement of that
region’s function.  The clear implication is, therefore, that such disengagement will also show
up as an fMRI signal.  In summary, it appears that activation of a given region in an fMRI scan
might imply either functional engagement, functional disengagement, or some modulation in
between.  To infer only one of these is unacceptable.
There’s another aspect of Logothetis and colleagues’ work that might give some cause for
concern regarding the scanning project.  This is illustrated by the following quotation:
“In all of the measurements, the signal-to-noise ratio of the neural signal was an average of
at least one order of magnitude higher than that of fMRI signals.  This observation indicates
that the statistical analyses and thresholding methods applied to the haemodynamic responses
probably underestimate a great deal of actual neural activity related to the stimulus or task, and
suggest that a certain degree of caution is called for when interpreting mapping studies,
particularly when precise localization of activity is required.” (Logothetis et al., 2001, p.154)
We are all used, by now, to seeing images of brains on which a particular region has been
colored to indicate that it activated reliably differently in two conditions.  This quote quite
clearly implies that what is indicated in such images is a subset, perhaps even a very small
subset, of the brain regions at which significantly different neural signals were present in those
conditions.  The uncolored regions represent in graphical terms the implicit assertion of a null
result, where the relevant statistics have been performed on a signal that is between ten and one
hundred times noiser than the (possibly functional) neural signal itself.  What are we to make of
such images?  Henson (2005) is rigorous enough to admit that we cannot make anything in the
absence of at least statistically reliable condition-by-region interaction in activation, but it
would be interesting to know whether all imaging results are reported so fastidiously.  My
strong suspicion is that they are not.
Summary of the function-to-structure mapping.
What implications does all this have on the status of the structure-to-function mapping and
its application to the development of theory in cognitive psychology?  It appears to imply that
virtually nothing concrete can be inferred from BOLD activation patterns with regards to the
operation, suppression or modulation of various putative functions.  Unless at least two
candidate psychological theories are each accompanied by a precise neural mechanism (not just
one from a variety of equipotent options), that specifies the necessary spatial arrangement of its
components (rather than their topology) and explicitly describes which systems are functional,
which are modulated and which are activated but nonfunctional (perhaps even suppressed) in a
given task, then it’s difficult to see how, say, fMRI images can be helpful in choosing between
them.  Of course, if theories are specified in such detail, it seems likely that they would make
some differential behavioral predictions too.  If they did, of course, there would be little or no
point in doing the neuroimaging.
This last point highlights why imaging data are not just another dependent variable like RT
or accuracy.  Even though behavioral data don’t always permit the falsification of all but one
theory, they are at least in principle capable of falsifying theories that make behavioral
predictions.  In many cases, therefore, observed behavior is the thing about which cognitive-
psychological models do (and should) make predictions.  That is not to say that observed
behavior is the only thing about which theories can make predictions. There is a long history of
the use of physiological measures (e.g., galvanic skin response, pupil diameter) in cognitive
psychology. Nonetheless, the quality of the theoretical inferences that can be made on the basis
of such measures is heavily dependent on the strength of the bridging hypotheses that relate
them to the engagement of particular psychological functions.  The BOLD signal as measured
by fMRI is not an aspect of behavior, so any functional inferences drawn from it must be
grounded on strong bridging assumptions.  Henson’s (2005) function-to-structure deduction and
his structure-to-function induction have been formulated to play precisely this role.  In this
section, I hope to have demonstrated that they are in no way strong enough to bear the
inferential weight that Henson and others wish to place on them.
Localization
Setting aside for a moment the incommensurate nature of psychological models on the one
hand and the BOLD signal on the other, it has been asserted that fMRI (among other methods)
might be able to locate (rather generally) particular functions to particular parts of the brain.  Of
course, this would presume some use of a structure-to-function mapping, but it might be a
rather coarse-grained one, not itself directed towards choosing between rather similar but
competing psychological theories but instead focused on a more general mapping of classes of
theories to broadly defined brain areas.  I absolutely concede the point and take as an example
the paper by Indefrey and Levelt (2004), in which the authors presented a comprehensive meta-
analysis of the imaging literature related to word production with the aim of specifying the
brain areas that subserve the various components of this multistage task.  Nonetheless, no
matter how meticulous the contribution to the broad localization of function, I cannot concede
the more general contribution to cognitive psychological theory.  This is because, taking the
Indefrey and Levelt example, all of the imaging data were interpreted by reference to a single
model of word production, namely that of Levelt et al.  (1999). Nothing in the meta-analysis
could, therefore, have been used to disconfirm the predictions of the model.  (Coltheart, this
issue, makes essentially the same point regarding papers by Winston et al., 2004, and Smith and
Jonides, 1997.) The Levelt et al.  model is one of a class of models that assume a more or less
common set of processes underlying speech production.  Again, to illustrate my point, I cannot
do better than to quote the authors themselves
“The theory explicates the successive computational stages of spoken word production, the
representations involved in these computations, and their time course.  The results of the meta-
analysis, however, do not hinge on this particular choice of theory, since differences between
the sequential LRM model and other models of word production...do not concern the assumed
processing levels but the exact nature of the information flow between them.  The method and
design of the neuroimaging experiments analyzed here were not suited to identify these rather
subtle differences between current models.” (Indefrey & Levelt, 2004, p.102)
To which I would do no more than add that it is not clear that the method and design of any
(practical) neuroimaging experiment would have been so suited.
The point should be clear:  Cognitive theory is not advanced by the localization of function
per se.  As Fodor (1999) put it with characteristic vividness,
”If the mind happens in space at all, it happens somewhere north of the neck.  What exactly
turns on knowing how far north? ”
One further illustration:  Suppose that you receive an spreadsheet from a trusted colleague,
listing in one column all the functional stages of a highly worked-out model of, say, word
production, and in the adjacent column a corresponding list of the brain areas at which each of
the functional stages had been reliably located.  You might indeed be impressed at the
accomplishment.  Now suppose the next day you receive an apologetic note from the same
colleague indicating that the columns in the previous day’s spreadsheet had been incorrectly
aligned, and that the corrected mapping was now attached.  What exactly would change
regarding your appreciation of the functional architecture of word production from one day to
the next?  Nothing, I would suggest.
There is, I think, one proviso.  Earlier, I referred to the possibility that functional
neuroimaging might play a role as an enabling technology in discovering the way in which the
brain implements the mind.  To be more specific, it may be the case that once particular
functions have been approximately localized in the brain (notwithstanding the analysis in the
previous sections), then other technologies (such as single-cell recordings or whatever) might
be used to study detailed properties of the particular brain areas so identified, in order to pin
down the particular mechanisms at work.  I certainly don’t rule this out.  Nonetheless, there are
still some hurdles to be negotiated.  First, if the follow-up technologies are invasive, then there
will ipso facto be ethical problems associated with their use.  This is particularly problematic
with regard to cognitive psychology, since many research areas of cognitive psychology (e.g.,
study of language, reasoning, emotion, etc.) specifically require the use of human, as opposed
to other animal, participants.  Second, the strategy may run up against the fact that the structure
of neocortex is approximately invariant across different areas.  This would tend to imply that
knowing about the neocortical localization of a particular function will not in itself furnish
strong constraints on possible mechanism.  This might be too pessimistic an assessment:  the
different Brodmann areas (Brodmann, 1909) into which the neocortex is often parcelled were
originally delineated on the basis of relatively subtle differences in cytoarchitectonic properties.
If those cytoarchitectonic properties are sufficient to constrain possible mechanism, and,
crucially, if the resulting constraints on possible mechanism are themselves sufficient to permit
the distinction between rival psychological theories (presumably expressed in some form of
connectionist model), then the locating of particular functions to particular area of cortex might
permit some rather indirect leverage on the functional architecture of the human mind.  I must
admit, though, that it seems something of a long shot.
Perhaps everyone can agree that if this is the way functional localization is to come to the aid
of cognitive-psychological theorizing then we should start insisting on some more obvious
efforts in that direction.  Dispiritingly often, imaging papers go to great lengths to establish the
locus of a particular function, only to leave it at that.  For example, a recent paper by Botvinick,
Cohen and Carter (2004) makes a good case that the activation of the anterior cingulate cortex
(ACC) has something to do with the psychological process of conflict monitoring.  It is far from
clear, though, how this advances theorizing about the process itself.  Tasks, such as the Stroop
(1935) task, are described as involving conflict not because they activate ACC but because that
is the way the behavioral effect has best been characterized.  No facts about the activation of
ACC could reasonably have been supposed to argue against the existence of some sort of
conflict in the Stroop task; and no cytoarchitectonic facts about ACC are brought to bear on the
plausibility of various psychological models of conflict monitoring.  Botvinick et al. present the
results of neural network simulations, but these too seem to be independent of any facts about
ACC or its activation, being driven, quite appropriately in my view, by the requirements of the
behavioral data.  If localization is going to enable theoretical development via a close
consideration of the constraints imposed by regional differences in cytoarchitectonic structure,
then let us have the claims made explicit so that they can be straightforwardly assessed.
Some examples from Henson (2005)
Having set out some of the principal theoretical issues, I will now discuss some of the
examples that Henson (2005) uses to illustrate his case.  I will try to show that these are less
convincing than he maintained.  To avoid the necessity to reproduce large numbers of color
plates here, I shall refer to Henson’s figures directly.
Recognition memory
The first of Henson’s (2005) examples involves recognition memory.  He briefly discusses
such memory in relation to the Remember/Know (R/K) distinction introduced by Tulving
(1985). In this paradigm, participants are presented with a series of stimuli in an exposure
phase; in a later test phase they are presented with further stimuli, some of which are “old” in
the sense that they were presented in the exposure phase, and some of which are “new”. The
task is to distinguish between the old and new stimuli and, further, for those items described as
old, to distinguish between decisions based on recollection of the prior exposure (“Remember”,
R) and those based on a sense of familiarity (“Know”, K). Behavior in such tasks has been
accounted for using “dual-process” models (e.g., Yonelinas, 2002) and so-called “single-
process” models (e.g., Heathcote, 2003; Donaldson, 1996). Henson (see his Figure 3a)
described a reliable cross-over interaction in activation between left inferior parietal cortex,
whose event-related BOLD response is strong for R judgements and weaker for both K
judgements and “New” (N) judgements, and right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, that activates
strongly for K responses, less strongly for N responses, and less strongly still for R responses.
This pattern of results led Henson et conclude that “the imaging data support dual-process
models over single-process models”.
There is much to be said here.  First, a warning regarding a potential confounding between
vehicle and content: there is no good reason to expect a continuum of memory strength to be
reflected in a continuum of activation strength; this would be to commit a vehicle-content error.
We do not expect actvations corresponding to memories of red things to be red, so we cannot
expect strong memories necessarily to involve strong activations.  It is not clear whether
Henson (2005) himself commits this solecism, although he comes close when he claims that “it
would be difficult to explain these imaging data in terms of purely quantitative differences in
memory strengths” — as if that is the way they would have to be explained.  Second, there’s
something funny about the data:  if activation of right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is
something to do with a measure of, or a judgment regarding, familiarity (which is how Henson
characterizes it both here and elsewhere), then why is that region activated less for R responses
(which are presumably familiar as well as recollected) than K responses and even N responses
(the latter being not familiar at all). The pattern more naturally suggests that the qualitative
difference in activation between R and K responses is more to do with the responses themselves
rather than any memory-strength representation or judgment. But if the imaging data are telling
us that there is something different about R and K responses, that is something we already
knew.  After all, for R responses participants say (and mean) “Remember” and for K responses
say (and mean) “Know”!  Did anyone really believe that there was no difference in brain
activation associated with participants issuing demonstrably different responses?
In fact, Henson (2005) himself (and Coltheart, this issue) dismantled the argument derived
from the imaging data for dual-process over single-process models.  He pointed out that
“in subsequent experiments, we interpreted the right dorsolateral prefrontal response in
terms of post-retrieval decision processes rather than familiarity or retrieval strength...and have
since associated familiarity with response reductions in anterior medial temporal cortex...”
(Henson, 2005, p.202)
Oddly, anterior medial temporal cortex didn’t get a mention in relation to the original
experiment, even though the subsequent experiments apparently fingered it as the site of
familiarity-based reductions in activation.  We are not told whether R responses were also
associated with such reductions, but reference to Henson et al.  (2003) makes clear that the
familiarity signal is “acontextual”. This supports the new localization of the familiarity signal to
the anterior medial temporal cortex (for both R and K responses), but actually rather weakens
Henson’s argument that qualitatively different R and K processes were at work.  This is
because the original significant crossover interaction between task and region has now been
replaced by what we presume to be a noncrossover interaction. Although Henson (2005) was
careful not to require a crossover interaction in activation before inferring a qualitative
difference, there is no doubt that the noncrossover pattern is more compatible than the
crossover with different brain regions having rather different, though monotonic, response
functions to a single underlying memory continuum.
And it gets worse, because it turns out that so-called single-process models are not single-
process at all, at least not in the sense that Henson (2005) implies.  Taking Donaldson’s (1996)
model as an example, it turns out that Donaldson’s theory is that R and K responses are based
on two thresholds applied to a single continuum of memory strength.  Memory strengths that
exceed the lower threshold but not the upper are designated K responses, with those exceeding
the upper threshold designated R responses.  Given that there are two thresholds, and thus two
threshold comparison processes (not to mention two different types of response, attitude, etc.),
on what basis is such a model described as a single-process model?  And in what way is it
obviously inconsistent with one brain region that responds to old stimuli whether they are
known or remembered (i.e., exceeding the lower threshold), and another brain region that only
responds when they are remembered (i.e., exceeding the higher threshold)?
In fact, even if you consider Donaldson’s dual-thresholds to be implemented by a single
process, whose operation and consequences are constrained to within a single brain area,
Henson’s (2005) logic still doesn’t hold.  Why?  Because Donaldson doesn’t even deny the
existence of separate processes associated with recollective memory. As he puts it,
“I am not claiming that there is no distinction to be made between recollective and
nonrecollective memory, only that this introspective technique [i.e., the remember/know
technique] fails to capture the distinction...to deny that people can sometimes recollect
encoding details, or that there are occasions when they cannot, would be silly.” (Donaldson,
1996, p.532, my parentheses)
Heathcote (2003) makes a related point, the basic observation being that neither is denying
the possibility of recollection.  Rather they are discussing whether and how such recollection
affects the behavior exhibited in the remember-know task.  But if, say, Donaldson, a so-called
single-process theorist, is quite content that both recollective and familiarity-based processes
are taking place, but with only one of them having an effect on R/K behavior, then in what way
could the imaging data help to decide the issue relative to such behavior?  This is another
example of the epiphenomenal activity problem.
Memory encoding and the subsequent memory paradigm
The second example Henson (2005) gave concerned the subsequent-memory paradigm, in
which participants are presented with several stimuli on which they perform a simple task while
being scanned.  They are specifically not invited to try to remember the stimuli.  Following a
later memory-test phase, during which participants indicate which stimuli they remember, the
original scans are backsorted into those deriving from the presentation of stimuli that were
subsequently forgotten, and those from subsequently remembered stimuli.  The context in
which Henson discusses this paradigm is in relation to two theories of memory encoding.  I will
use his words, so we can be quite clear about the claims he makes:
“According to what I shall call “structural” theories, there exists a cognitive system
specialized for episodic memory...According to “proceduralist” theories on the other
hand...memory is better viewed as a by-product of the processes performed when a stimulus is
encountered....An important difference between these two types of theories is whether
successful remembering always involves a specific psychological process, supported by a
specialized memory system, or whether remembering can be associated with different processes
on different occasions.  This can be tested by comparing subsequent memory effects under
different study tasks:  according to the structural theories (T0), the brain regions correlating
with subsequent memory should not differ across tasks, whereas according to procedural
theories (T1), they should.” (Henson, 2005, p.202)
Before tackling the questionable logic of this statement, I shall briefly describe the imaging
results.  Otten et al.  (2001) had backsorted scans according to subsequent memory, for words
that had either been semantically processed or orthographically processed at study.  They had
found that for both encoding contexts there was a correlation between left medial-temporal-lobe
activity and subsequent memory.  This was taken to support a structural view.  In a different
experiment, Otten and Rugg (2001) compared semantic and phonological encoding-contexts
and found “a region within anterior medial frontal cortex that showed greater subsequent
memory activations under the semantic task, and regions within left intraparietal sulcus and
superior occipital cortex that showed greater subsequent memory activations under the
phonological task”. This was taken to support the procedural view.
The ambiguity in these results only goes to highlight the faulty underlying logic.  First, there
is no necessary incompatibility between the structural and proceduralist theories:  subsequent
memory might depend on both stimulus-specific processes and general memory processes;
indeed, that seems rather likely a priori (by which I mean, given previous behavioral data).
Neither imaging result ruled out either theory; neither did the imaging results particularly
support one over the other.  To be explicit, although Otten et al.  (2001) had found a common
brain region that correlated with subsequent memory for differently encoded stimuli, they
couldn’t plausibly have asserted that it was the same neurons that were involved each time.  Of
course, if memory networks are simply defined by where they are generally in the brain (e.g.,
medial temporal lobe, MTL) then one is tempted to make this identity, but it might just as well
have been one set of MTL neurons whose activity correlated with subsequent memory for
semantically encoded material, and another set whose activity correlated with subsequent
memory for orthographically encoded material.  In which case, the memory systems involved
would have been “procedural all the way up”, not withstanding the incorrect inference from the
imaging data.
Likewise, finding that the activation of different regions correlated with subsequent memory
for different encoding contexts is hardly conclusive.  Did anyone seriously maintain beforehand
that exactly the same neurons were involved in exactly the same way for doing semantic
judgments on one hand and phonological judgments on the other?  Given that, did anyone
seriously entertain that nothing about the relevant processes would differ for subsequently
remembered items as opposed to subsequently forgotten ones?  The only interesting question
seemed to be whether or not the fMRI scanner was sensitive enough to spot whatever it was
that differed.  Even given that the scanner was able to spot activation differences, there was no
evidence regarding which, if any, of these activation differences were causally related to the
memorial process at encoding.  To expand upon this point somewhat, suppose a given trial
induces epiphenomenal activation whose strength is correlated (for whatever reason) with the
activation of memorial processes that are genuinely causally related to later performance.  How
do we know which of the regions whose activations are correlated with subsequent memory,
were involved with memorial encoding at the time, as opposed to the other epiphenomenal (but
causally unrelated) processes?  The point is rather reinforced by the fact that Henson (2005), in
his summary of Otten and Rugg (2001), only mentions two of the several regions whose
activation correlated with later memory in the phonological task.  What of the other regions?
Was their activation considered epiphenomenal?  And how might one tell?
To summarize the second of Henson’s (2005) examples, proceduralist theories “predicted”
one thing, structuralist theories “predicted” another; as it turned out, either both things
happened, or they didn’t, or it was some mixture of the two.
Short-term memory
Henson’s (2005) next example used experiments on short-term memory to illustrate the
operation of the structure-to-function induction.  He discussed the difference between two
visually presented tasks:  an item-probe task, in which a list of items is presented followed by a
test-item that the participant has to identify as either a member of the preceding list or not; and
a list-probe task, in which the probe is another list containing the same items as the first but
either in the same or different serial order.  These two tasks were combined with the
manipulation of the temporal grouping of the six-item stimulus list, which was either presented
with a constant stimulus-onset-asynchrony (SOA) or with a long SOA separating two groups of
three items.  Henson also noted that grouping has been held to reflect the operation of a
“timing” signal by some (e.g.  Burgess & Hitch, 1999; Brown et al., 2000). The scanning
findings, at least the subset of them presented by Henson (2005), are rather uninformative.  He
drew attention to an area of left dorsal premotor region that was “more active in the list probe
than the item probe task, but less active in the grouped than the ungrouped list probe task”.
Henson claims that this is “consistent with utilization and modulation, respectively, of a timing
signal like that proposed by Burgess and Hitch (1999)”. Well yes.  It is also consistent with
models of serial recall that include a positional signal that is not derived from a timing signal,
and would potentially even be consistent with models of serial recall that acknowledge neither a
timing nor a positional signal, though no such models exist owing to the overriding constraints
placed on models by the behavioral data.  In fact, the activation of the highlighted area might
conceivably even indicate task difficulty, given that we know very well that grouped lists are
easier to recall than ungrouped lists.
It is at this point that Henson (2005) invoked the structure-to-function induction, citing
another imaging study in which the “same” region was “more active for sequential rather than
repetitive finger movements”, and a neuropsychological study in which patients with damage to
“this region” had difficulties reproducing rhythmic motor sequences.  Neither of these citations,
however, does anything to cement the link between that brain region and a timing signal, as
opposed to a positional signal, or even sequence representation more generally.  One is
reminded of the Abraham Maslow’s quip, “When all you own is a hammer, every problem
looks like a nail”. It seems that when one favours a timing theory, one sees its confirmation in a
variety of brain measures, even though these are just as consistent with any one of the rival
theories.
In summary, Henson’s (2005) application of the structure-to-function induction to short-term
memory is completely uninformative with regard to the merits or otherwise of the competing
theories in the area.
Given that Henson’s final example involves reasoning on the basis of MEG data, it is not
within my current purview beyond noting that his account suggests that the imaging data were
actively unhelpful in shaping his opinions about repetition priming.  I will move, therefore to
discussing the contribution of Shallice (2003), in which a similar story unfolds.
Shallice (2003)
In his defense of the use of functional neuroimaging in the development of cognitive theory,
Shallice (2003) goes further than did Henson (2005) in the assumptions that he considers
necessary.  In particular, he requires three things to be true:
1. processing is carried out by “isolable subsystems”.
2. no [brain] region realizes more than one subsystem per task.
3. “the resource required by a subsystem in performance of a given task can be thought of
as being monotonically related to the “local average neural activity” (p.  S148) and further that
“the relation between specific resource requirement of a task and activation is linear” (Shallice,
2003, p.  S149).
The first of these is expressed as a hope:  unless it’s broadly true (and it might not be) then a
good deal of theorizing in cognitive psychology is vulnerable.  The second seems to be to be
little more than speculative and is additionally heavily dependent on how one defines a brain
“region”. It is far from clear that the brain is made up of spatially segregated regions (especially
at the resolution of fMRI), in each of which a given task “activates” only a single subsystem.
The third assumption is one at which Henson himself blanches.  Specifically, Henson is happy
to conclude that an area is “engaged” in a task, whenever there is differential activation in that
area under the relevant conditions.  He expressly does not care whether there is a reduction in
BOLD signal or, alternatively, an increase; as long as there is a change in BOLD signal then
Henson is content to consider the region as being involved, provided his statistical conditions
are met.  As I’ve tried to point out above, this leads Henson into inducing behavioral
engagement of a function even if its engagement is epiphenomenal or even explicitly
suppressed.  Nonetheless, Shallice appears to commit the greater vehicle-content error when he
assumes a monotonic linear relationship between regional activation and cognitive “resource”.
The assumption is still the more puzzling because we are given no idea where it might have
arisen.
To take an example, suppose one were a proponent of a dual-route model of word reading
(of which more later), in which one (functional) route acts on the basis of “regular” spelling-to-
sound correspondences, and is able, therefore, to produce regularized pronunciations of words
and plausible pronunciations of nonwords.  The other route is a lexical route within which the
(possibly irregular) pronunciations of words are stored and accessed.  In order to explain the
relevant behavioral data, all such models have to assume that both routes are activated on
presentation of both types of word (regular and irregular) as well as on presentation of a
nonword.  Given this fact, it would seem relevant to Shallice’s argument to ask whether the
lexical “resource” would be activated more for a low-neighborhood high-frequency word or a
high-neighborhood nonword.  I am not in a position to do the relevant simulations, though
given Shallice’s qualms about relating connectionist models to imaging data (Shallice, 2003, p.
S147), it’s not at all clear what simulations one might do.  Nevertheless, it seems that using as a
guide the “local average neural activity” in a lexical route, it would not be in the least bit
surprising to conclude that the nonword uses more of a lexical resource than the highly frequent
word.  These are the sorts of conclusions one is led to make when one mixes talk of “cognitive
resources”, specified relative to some theory, and the local average activation of brain regions.
The situation is not improved by assuming a linear relationship between the two.
Shallice (2003) bolstered his case by reference to the Hemispheric Encoding and Retrieval
Asymmetry (HERA) model of Tulving, Kapur, Craik, Moscovitch and Houle (1994). This
constituted a claim about the “relative lateralization of the encoding and retrieval stages of
[verbal] episodic memory task performance” (Shallice, p.  S149). As the reader might have
guessed, this claim was itself primarily based on functional neuroimaging data of various sorts.
There are are several points to make about Shallice’s choice of HERA as a worked example.
First, it is rather an odd model for Shallice (2003) to choose if he wished to illustrate the
usefulness of imaging to cognitive theorizing.  That is because there seems very little of
cognitive substance to the claim that HERA embodied.  Unlike the vast majority of cognitive
theories, HERA expressly drew attention to the neural localization of various processes:
encoding (relatively) left hemisphere; retrieval (relatively) right.  Nothing about the functional
architecture of the system would have been (necessarily) different if the mapping were reversed
or, indeed, nonexistent.  It was presumably clear from the start that encoding and retrieval were
not literally the same process; had it not been, the scanning tasks would have been somewhat
tricky to design.  It was also presumably clear on logical grounds that encoding and retrieval
must engage at least some common brain parts (for a given participant and episode), lest the
brain be supposed to function like a stage magician, putting things in one box and retrieving
them from another.  So what of functional significance was contributed by the hemispheric
distinction per se?
Second, as Shallice’s (2003) HERA example unfolds, it becomes increasingly clear that the
functional imaging results were actively unhelpful in locating encoding and retrieval processes,
even for those interested in establishing their locations.  I shall not reprise the whole story here
but it turned out that, contrary to the most straightforward prediction, patients with right-
hemisphere damage were not impaired in their levels of verbal episodic retrieval (Stuss et al.,
1994; Swick & Knight, 1996, etc.). Shallice suggested three reasons for the disparity, each of
which is illustrative (for my purposes) of a wider issue.  His first reason involved noting that
“prefrontal cortex” (towards which the HERA claim was directed) is a big place; more
specifically he noted that other studies had found that different parts of prefrontal cortex were
differently engaged by different retrieval tasks.  This straightforwardly questions the wisdom of
talking about brain regions as if they were functionally circumscribed.  His second point was
that although “in many studies the right prefrontal activation is stronger than the left...or it is
only the right prefrontal that is significant...in other studies in which activation has been found
in right prefrontal cortex in experiments on episodic memory retrieval , a comparable if
frequently lower degree of activation has been found in left prefrontal cortex”. Whatever this
means with regard to the functional conclusions that can be drawn, it certainly implies that
Henson’s (2005) strict statistical requirements for activation-by-region interactions were
somewhat relaxed in interpretation of the earlier data.  Finally, Shallice’s third and “most
critical” point was that the earlier function-to-structure deduction regarding right-hemisphere
retrieval was probably incorrect in the first place!  He noted that retrieval had previously been
considered as engaging a multitude of functions, including a post-retrieval checking mechanism
(Burgess & Shallice, 1996). Shallice is quite clear that this consideration had itself stemmed
from a neuropsychological/behavioral observation, namely that patients with right-hemisphere
damage tended to repeat themselves in free recall (Stuss et al.  1994). To cut a long story short,
right hemisphere “activation” was eventually attributed to this checking mechanism, with later
imaging studies settling on the left prefrontal cortex after all as being the site for recollection
(though not familiarity judgment, see earlier). At no point that I can see did the imaging results
lead the functional decomposition of the task; they were used solely to localize the constituent
functions, sometimes inappropriately.
Single- and dual-mechanism models
Having previously delivered various versions of this article in lecture form, I have noted that
the distinction between single- and dual-mechanism models is often raised in subsequent
discussion.  It is therefore worth discussing, albeit briefly.  The basic intuition seems to be that
functional neuroimaging will be helpful in choosing between single-mechanism models on the
one hand and dual-mechanism models on the other.  Because they are the most frequently
discussed topics of this type, I shall consider the question with reference to regular/irregular
past-tense production and, first, to models of single-word reading (spelling-to-sound).
Single word reading
Single-word reading has (on the face of it - see below), been the subject of debates between
dual-route theorists, who make a distinction between lexical and nonlexical routes in reading,
and single-route theorists, who do not.  With regard to the implications of functional
neuroimaging, I am fortunate that Coltheart (2002, this issue) has already made many of the
principal arguments. Nonetheless, I think they bear developing here for completeness.
Coltheart is, of course, in an interesting position here, because as one of the principal advocates
of dual-route models in this area he potentially has much to gain from imaging data, if such
appear to support his position.  Indeed, it seems that he (and those on his side of the debate)
have nothing to lose from allowing imaging data into the debate.  And that is exactly the point!
Among other things, Coltheart is unwilling to accept any imaging data as being supportive of
his position precisely because no imaging data could contradict his position. Nothing about the
dual-route position mandates that the two routes should be located in different regions of the
brain.  Indeed given that (in respect of reading) both its lexical and nonlexical routes draw on a
common orthographic input stage and drive a common phonological output stage, it might be
supposed, a priori, that the two routes would be physically close, even interdigitated. No
imaging result that showed the “same regions engaged” in the reading of exception words and
nonwords, could possibly be interpreted as contradicting either a dual- or a single-route model.
But what if neuroimaging suggested two regions, one that “activated” during irregular-word
reading, and one that “activated” for nonword reading (or some such comparison). Wouldn’t
that be good evidence against single-route models (as Henson, 2005, footnote 10 insists) and in
favour of dual-route models?  Well no, because the dual-route models make no such necessary
prediction.  As I hope to have made clear above, it is a fundamental feature of dual-route
models that both routes are engaged even for irregular words and nonwords; this feature is
necessary to explain, for example, the reaction time cost of irregularity and its interaction with
frequency.  Even a putative dual-route model that offered some other explanation for these
behavioral effects and that posited, say, that an irregular word suppressed the sublexical route,
would have quite arbitrarily to assume that the shutting down of a given route would not lead to
metabolic activity in the corresponding brain region, contra the work of Logothetis et al., as
described earlier.
As a final gambit it is possible, I suppose, that even if a two-region imaging pattern were not
consistent in detail with a dual-route model, some dedicated dual-router might maintain that it
was even more straightforwardly inconsistent with a single-route model.  Obviously this would
be somewhat clutching at straws.  In response, I would note that even those spelling-to-sound
models that have traditionally been conceived as single-route are actually, as far as imaging is
concerned (and perhaps as far as theory is concerned too - but that’s another question), more
like dual-route models than is usually conceded. Taking the familiar triangle model (Plaut,
McClelland, Seidenberg & Patterson, 1996) as representative, it has two functional routes from
spelling to sound:  one is relatively direct, bridging the orthographic and phonological
representations with a single layer of hidden nodes; the other proceeds somewhat indirectly via
a representation of semantics.  As a consequence, the real distinctions between the “single-
route” triangle model and its more explicitly dual-route competitors are whether its “semantic”
route includes lexical representations (possibly with semantics “branching off”), and whether
the more direct route, with its absence of explicit lexical representations, maintains an
independent ability to read exception words.  Neither of these issues is ever likely to be decided
by fMRI and, ipso facto, neither is the debate between “single-” and dual-route models of
single-word reading.
Past-tense representation
The situation in relation to the representation of the English past tense turns out to be similar
(and possibly related). The classical debate has once again been between proponents of dual-
mechanism and single-mechanism models.  Dual-mechanism theorists believe that mappings
between stems and regular past-tense forms (jump ® jumped) are implemented by a rule of the
form X®X+'ed' (with some phonological adjustment), whereas mappings between stems and
irregular past-tense forms (bring ® brought) are stored by a purely associative process linking
the undecomposed lexical forms.  By contrast, single-mechanism theorists believe that a single
process suffices to explain both regular and irregular mappings.  As with the “single-route”
spelling-to-sound models, we have to be careful with what is meant here.  Probably the most
prominent single-mechanism model is that of Joanisse and Seidenberg (1999), with which the
authors attempted to account for neuropsychological-behavioral data that otherwise seemed to
support a dual-route account.  The details are not germane, but Joanisse and Seidenberg showed
that similar data could be simulated by their model by virtue of differential damage to two loci:
a semantic locus (that was actually lexical); and a phonological locus.  Their simulations
suggested that irregular past tenses were more adversely affected by damage to an area
representing what they called semantic information (that was in fact lexical information).
Regular past tenses were more affected by damage to areas representing phonology.  Whatever
the implications of this model for the interpretation of the neuropsychological-behavioral data
(and, rather crucially, for the taxonomy of models into single- and dual-mechanism), it should
already be clear that functional neuroimaging is not going to be decisive.  Given that both
classes of model suggest differential reliance on two flavors of processing (semantic/lexical and
phonological in one case, lexical and morphophonological in the other), both seem able to deal
with any neuroimaging pattern that might plausibly emerge.
This is potentially an illustration of the problem referred to earlier, namely that which stems
from assuming that different regions must implement different functions.  Joanisse and
Seidenberg’s (1999) model involves a single set of “hidden units” that receive input from two
separate sets of units labelled “speech input” and “semantics”. These hidden units in turn send
signals back to the semantic units and, separately, to a set of “speech output” units.  It is clear
that it is a topological model rather than a spatial one.  Suppose that we take some of the
“hidden units” and move them to a place in the brain physically nearer to the representation of
semantics.  Some other units might be moved to a place in the brain nearer to the representation
of speech output.  Suppose further that, although the general topology of connections was
maintained, the error-term from nearer output units (speech or semantics) affected more
strongly the development of connections to and from the corresponding hidden units.  In this
way, although the model would be topologically single-route, and perhaps even definitionally
so (their being no clear distinction between rule-based learning and associative learning), it
might show characteristics of a dual-route model if examined solely with respect to patterns of
spatial activation.
Perhaps this is why, in some recent spirited comment on this topic, proponents of neither the
single-route nor the dual-route view referred to any functional neuroimaging data (McClelland
& Patterson, 2002a, 2002b; Pinker & Ullman, 2002a, 2002b, 2003; Ramscar, 2003; Seidenberg
& Joanisse, 2003). Instead, the currency in which the debate has been and continues to be
transacted is firmly that of behavioral and neuropsychological-behavioral data (e.g., Longworth
et al, 2005; Miozzo, 2003; Tyler et al.  2004). In a brief follow-up Marslen-Wilson and Tyler
(2003) did refer to preliminary imaging results, though in their reply McClelland and Patterson
(2003) insist that “all of the findings are consistent with [their] account” without referring
explicitly to the imaging data.  Interestingly, Marslen-Wilson and Tyler (2003) conclude their
account, that includes reference to a variety of neurophysiological findings, by claiming that
they “remain agnostic as to the types of mental computation implicated by these results”. This
is a slightly odd claim because if the past-tense debate is about anything, then it is about “types
of mental computation”. Maybe they were drawing attention to the fact that no amount of
neuroimaging will indicate the types of mental computation that are being imaged.
Why does it matter?
If I have made the case with any success that functional neuroimaging is unlikely decisively
to advance cognitive theory, then the question might be raised as to whether this matters
terribly much.  After all, I’ve tried to be clear that there is much good science to be found in the
neuroimaging literature.  In the latter part of this article I will outline a case that it does indeed
matter and, moreover, that the overplaying of functional neuroimaging might have undesirable
consequences for the future development of cognitive psychology as a discipline.
The first point to note is that the current vogue for cognitive neuroimaging would be of little
negative consequence if the method were cheap to practice and resource-light.  Unfortunately it
is anything but.  Although the figure is sometimes difficult to obtain, I understand that
somebody wishing to run an experimental participant for one hour in a typical fMRI study
would not expect to receive much change from £1000 ($ US 1750). This is two orders of
magnitude higher than the typical payment made to participants in more conventional
experimental settings.  Whether these costs fully cover the very high purchase costs and
running costs that attend an MRI scanner is also difficult to ascertain:  at least some portion of
the salaries of additional personnel (e.g., physicists, technicians) that are employed directly by
interested psychology departments might be considered to come on top of the per-subject cost.
Whatever the exact figure, this represents a very large investment on behalf of psychology
departments and, hence, psychology funders (among others).
Second, we should note that large capital investments tend to concentrate subsequent
funding around them.  Funding bodies that have committed large amounts of money to a capital
project are, for understandable reasons, loathe to let that project fail for lack of ongoing
funding.  Indeed, they may even be tempted to provide lavish funds in an attempt to justify their
original decision.  Somewhat perversely, this might be especially the case if the original
decision starts to look shaky.  (I leave any more involved social psychological speculation to
those better qualified to indulge in it.)
Both these observations point to a fairly obvious fact, namely that functional neuroimaging
does, and will continue to, absorb resources at a relatively high level.  Again, this would not be
a problem for cognitive psychology per se, if those resources were not coming from a limited
pool of research funds from which experimental cognitive psychology must itself draw.  But it
seems clear that some, if not most, of the money that currently funds functional neuroimaging
comes from a pool from which experimental cognitive psychology has traditionally drawn.
And here is the nub:  if cognitive neuroimaging either hasn’t yet paid (Coltheart, this issue), or
by its very nature won’t pay (above), its way in terms of theoretical advance, then cognitive
psychology must indeed suffer the consequences.  Lest this be seen as mere scaremongering, I
have already heard of at least one example (from the US) in which a grant application in the
area of experimental cognitive psychology (i.e., behavioral work) was refused. The applicant
subsequently resubmitted the (considerably more expensive) request, with the same behavioral
work outlined but with additional neuroimaging proposals in which s/he had no real interest.
The second request was met with a positive response.  One can only assume that the additional
funding allocated to unwanted neuroimaging was withdrawn from some other unlucky
applicant.
There is another resource apart from money that may well (have) become concentrated
around cognitive neuroimaging, that is, people.  It seems that in recent years some (though
thankfully not all) of the very best psychology postgraduates and postdocs have “gone into
scanning”. No doubt this is sound career move, particularly if my analysis of the monetary
resource issue is anything like correct.  However, it does risk the impoverishment of more
traditional experimental cognitive psychology as a field.  Even if those attracted into
neuroimaging still think of themselves as cognitive psychologists, the large amount of extra
time and knowledge that must be invested in their new trade can only detract from the
theoretical contributions they might otherwise have made.
To be successful as a field, I maintain that cognitive psychology needs a readier supply of
“mindscanners” than of brainscanners.  I take a mindscanner to be an individual trained in
(cognitive) psychological theory, able to identify areas of significant theoretical dispute,
capable of designing, running and analyzing appropriate experimental tests, and willing to
relate quantitatively the results of those tests to the predictions of the relevant theories (perhaps
embodied as computational and/or connectionist models). Even if readers are more optimistic
than am I regards a significant role for functional neuroimaging in the development of cognitive
theory, it should still be clear that a secure supply of mindscanners is absolutely necessary if
there are to be theories to test, tasks to scan, and inductions to be made.
This appeal to the redirection of resources from machinery to people might seem rather
sentimental.  I anticipate that the word “Luddite” will not be far away from the lips of my
critics.  Perhaps so.  But the analogy is only apposite if one refuses to accept the arguments
developed above.  After all, the Luddites were protesting against the introduction of machines
that were (apparently) less expensive and more efficient at weaving cloth than were they.  If
cognitive theory can be taken to be the cloth that cognitive psychologists are attempting to
weave, then it is precisely my case that functional neuroimaging is, in this regard, more
expensive and less efficient.  The exact reverse of Luddism.
I have two further points to make, and both reflect on the status and image of cognitive
psychology among the general public.  Seldom a week goes by without their appearing on, say,
the BBC news website, some reference to a functional neuroimaging experiment.  I’m sure the
same can be said for media outlets in other parts of the world.  In most cases, the article is
accompanied by a picture purporting to show a part of the brain “activating” in response to
some task or other. Very often, the detail of the study and, indeed, the means by which the
picture was obtained, are eschewed in favor of some summary such as “Scientists have
discovered that when people do X, a part of their brain activates”. I am not naive enough to
believe that journalists never spice up a story, or always report accurately what they are told by
the scientist.  Nonetheless, the frequency with which this sort of vacuous statement is made is
starting to cause some concern.  To whit, if the general public gets the idea that producing
pictures of the brain is what cognitive psychologists do and, indeed, that cognitive
psychologists who don’t produce such pictures are not doing their job, then there is a risk that
the tyranny of the graphical over the contentful will be exercised in our own realm as it has
been in so many others (e.g., mainstream film production).
Finally, I would like to draw attention to the disadvantages inherent in the creeping
medicalization of cognitive psychology.  I can see clear dangers looming if, perhaps via on
over-reliance on neuroimaging techniques, we allow cognitive psychology to become seen as a
branch of the medical sciences.  The problem is not so much in the short-term, since money for
“medical” purposes might initially be easier to come by.  The drift might prove
counterproductive, however, in the longer term.  If money for basic cognitive psychology is
increasingly dressed up as being for medical research, while reliance is decreased on funding
sources that see cognitive psychological knowledge as an end in itself, then sooner or later
somebody will ask what medical benefits have thereby been gained.  Since, for many branches
of cognitive psychology, these are likely to be slim or even nonexistent, a sudden reduction in
available funds might be precipitated.  This is very possibly an over-dramatization, but for
those who are doubtful that anything like it could happen, I draw attention to the ominous
portents of a recent reorganization at the U.S. National Institute for Mental Health, as described
in Holden (2004). In brief, the reorganization resulted in basic cognitive and behavioral
research being lowered in priority unless it could be shown to have a “strong disease
component”, an outcome that caused some consternation among leading cognitive researchers.
This indicates very clearly what happens when behavioral researchers come to rely on funding
from medical sources and when those medical sources subsequently, and possibly quite
reasonably, decide to concentrate their resources on the treatment of illness.  Somewhat by way
of a (telling) aside, such concerns regarding the medicalization of psychology were buttressed
recently when the UK national broadcaster (i.e., the BBC) chose as the presenter of a major
new series on “The Human Mind” a (very eminent) embryologist, someone whose proper
business might, to paraphrase Fodor, be deemed to be some way south of the neck!
Conclusion
In this article, I have sought to do no more than raise questions regarding both the
retrospective and prospective contribution of functional neuroimaging regards the development
of cognitive theory. When I first started writing the talk on which this article was based, I
thought it inconceivable that some fifteen years of (relatively expensive) work in the area
would not have contributed significantly to cognitive theory.  Coltheart (2002, this issue) raised
some doubts, and writing this paper only served to crystallize them.  If responses to this article
and Coltheart’s are able to demonstrate where and how such a contribution has been made, then
perhaps such demonstrations will help increase the future hit-rate.  If they are not, then some
serious reflection is in order.
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